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Wasta! The long-term implications of education expansion and
economic liberalisation on politics in Sudan
Laura Mann∗
African Studies Centre, University of Leiden, Leiden, the Netherlands
By tracking the changing nature of wasta, or personal intermediation, in the Khartoum
labour market, this paper examines the impact of Islamist policies on state–society
relations in Khartoum, Sudan. It argues that economic liberalisation and higher
education expansion weakened sectarian control over the economy, replacing the
former institutionalised system of privilege with a much more decentralised, private
and transnational structure. The conclusion asks whether these policies have laid the
groundwork for long-term political transformation. While education expansion and
liberalisation should theoretically allow a regime to broaden patronage networks, they
may also reduce the capacity of both the regime and the private sector to exercise
power and establish predictability outwards.
Keywords: Sudan; liberalisation; higher education expansion; employment;
recruitment; patronage; wasta; intermediation; Islamism
[Wasta ! Les implications a` long terme du de´veloppement de l’e´ducation et de la
libe´ralisation e´conomique au Soudan.] En suivant la nature changeante du wasta, ou
l’interme´diation personnelle sur le marche´ du travail de Khartoum, cet article
examine l’impact des politiques islamistes sur les relations E´tat-socie´te´ a` Khartoum,
Soudan. Il afﬁrme que la libe´ralisation e´conomique et l’expansion de l’enseignement
supe´rieur ont affaibli le controˆle sectaire sur l’e´conomie, remplac¸ant le syste`me
institutionnalise´ des privile`ges, pre´valant auparavant, par une structure prive´e et
transnationale bien plus de´centralise´e. La conclusion pose la question de la manie`re
dont ces politiques ont jete´ les bases d’une transformation politique a` long terme.
Alors que le de´veloppement de l’e´ducation et la libe´ralisation devraient
the´oriquement permettre au re´gime d’e´largir les re´seaux de cliente´lisme, ils devraient
aussi permettre de re´duire la capacite´ du re´gime et du secteur prive´ a` exercer leur
pouvoir et d’instaurer une pre´visibilite´ pour l’exte´rieur.
Mots-cle´s: Soudan; libe´ralisation; expansion de l’enseignement supe´rieur; emploi;
recrutement; cliente´lisme; wasta; interme´diation; Islamisme
Introduction
While there has been much discussion of political violence in Sudan’s peripheries, less atten-
tion has been paid to Khartoum, the country’s capital and its historic locus of civic mobil-
isation. Student protests, union strikes, controversies within the National Congress Party
(NCP), and an alliance between oppositional parties and rebel groups all signal mounting
instability. This paper argues that a more grounded sociological perspective is needed to
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understand this instability. The Islamists did not merely use military power to seize control,
but long-term economic and ideological power to upset sectarian control over politics and
reconﬁgure state–society relations. Speciﬁcally, they pursued ﬁnancial Islamisation,
higher education expansion and liberalisation. In the process, they destroyed any semblance
of a public, institutionalised system of governance, creating a more private, decentralised
and transnational one. The Islamists have thus far demonstrated considerable talents in
retaining control over this system, but it will become more difﬁcult as oil revenue dwindles.
The paper draws on three sources: 18 months of ethnographic ﬁeldwork conducted on
university campuses and recruitment centres between 2008 and 2010, 159 interviews with
civil servants, managers and job seekers and a 400-person survey conducted in 14 different
organisations (three banks, two engineering consultancies, one large private family
business, four hospitals and four NGOs) and on public buses. This survey was adapted
from Mark Granovetter’s study of United States job searching and asked how employees
had found their current jobs (Granovetter 1973). While ﬁeldwork sought to uncover chan-
ging employment and recruitment practices, a broader story of political change emerged
that warranted attention. This paper links empirical ﬁndings on employment to wider ques-
tions of state–society relations. More broadly, it engages with ideas about the development
of patrimonialism (Bach 2012; Van de Walle 2012). It is no longer enough to declare a state
neo-patrimonial, but rather to inquire what kind of patrimonialism pervades (Bach 2012;
Van de Walle 2012; Kelsall 2013). Are channels of patronage conﬁned to elites or do
they trickle down? Education expansion and liberalisation should theoretically allow a
regime to broaden its networks, but such policies may also slacken control and reduce
the capacity of the regime to direct the economy for political gain. Such policies may
also diminish coordination between non-state actors if such expansions and liberalisations
weaken societal trust and communication. A transition from elite clientelism to mass clien-
telism requires a coordinative structure for directing power and opportunity.
The paper is divided into four sections. The ﬁrst section introduces the concept of wasta,
or personal intermediation. The colonial state nationalised relations of wasta into an institu-
tionalised and state-centralised system that favoured certain social groups over others.
Within this system, alternative political groups were unable to challenge sectarian control.
The following three sections employ a historical narrative charting Islamist strategy to over-
turn this system. Section two (titled 1970s to 1989: ‘going to the market’) describes the
movement’s role in the Islamisation of ﬁnance and the encouragement of entrepreneurship
from the 1970s. Sections three (titled 1989–1999: Tamkeen) and four (1999–2013: liberal-
isation) then break Islamist rule into two periods: a period of tamkeen (empowerment) from
1989 to 1999 and a more pragmatic period in the 2000s. Section three focuses on the infor-
malisation of state institutions and the disintegration of institutionalised trust, while section
four concentrates on the ‘exogenous modernisation’ of the economy through Asian and Gulf
investment. This section underscores the regime’s dependence on oil to maintain patronage
and contain instability caused by state informalisation. The conclusion asks whether the dis-
integration of sectarian control under the Islamists may have laid the groundwork for broader
political engagements in future. It argues that while Islamist policies have destroyed the
restrictive elite clientelism of sectarian politics, they have done so only through destroying
the broader coordinative capabilities of the economy and political system.
Wasta: loyalty plus access to power
During my ﬁeldwork, graduates would smile and ask, ‘So you are studying how people get
jobs? So you are studying wasta, right?’ ‘Wasta’ is the Arabic word for personal
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intermediation. It signiﬁes both the possession of ties (a person can ‘have wasta’) and the
person who intermediates on behalf of someone (a person can be ‘one’s wasta’). It has
become so important in securing livelihoods that young people refer to it as ‘Vitamin
Waw’. In my survey of 400 professionals, a clear pattern emerged: wasta appeared to be
growing more important and stronger.
Figure 1 shows the source of job information used by employees, broken down by age.
We observe how older respondents were more likely to have heard about their jobs from
central work ofﬁces and from newspaper advertisements. In contrast, over 80% of the
respondents in the lowest age bracket received information about their jobs from personal
contacts. A similar trend is observed when comparing sources of information by period of
recruitment. Those hired in earlier periods were more likely to use direct application (gov-
ernment bodies) or newspaper advertisements than those today.
Figure 2 shows ‘strength of tie’ by age. Strength refers to the frequency of contact
between the informant and job-seeker: if someone saw the contact frequently prior to the
job, he or she would be classiﬁed as a strong tie. Figure 2 reveals the dependence of the
youth on very strong ties for job information relative to their older counterparts. A similar
trend is again observed when using period of recruitment. Respondents hired in earlier
periods were more likely to have been given information by weaker ties than those today.
Lastly, the survey revealed that graduates from peripheral areas such as Darfur and
South Sudan depend on state bodies, newspaper advertisements and on weaker educational
and occupational-based ties. These three ﬁndings signal that wasta is not a tribalistic or tra-
ditional force rooted in the past, but rather one that is dynamic and feeding upon liberalisa-
tion. I propose that the strengthening of wasta in the labour market stems from Islamist
Figure 1. Source of information about job by age.
Review of African Political Economy 563
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
it L
eid
en
 / L
UM
C]
 at
 03
:26
 24
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
policies that have sought to upset sectarian political control. This upsetting of the insti-
tutional order has created a ‘hyperinﬂation’ of qualiﬁcations and a dissolution of trust
between strangers and weak ties. In order to understand this point, it is ﬁrst necessary to
describe how wasta came to be institutionalised in state institutions during the colonial
period and why the Islamists felt it necessary to restructure society so dramatically. What
the rest of this section shows is the dual development of sectarian political governance
and state (and elitist) forms of wasta.
Cunningham and Sarayrah describe how wasta began as an ‘intercessory force’ of con-
ﬂict mediation in communities (Cunningham and Sarayrah 1993). A wasta was a well-
respected community member trusted to intermediate between conﬂicting parties. When
the British colonised the Arab world, this system was hijacked for political expedience.
Under colonialism, a wasta drew power both from his role as mediator but also as a
broker of state resources. If a father wanted his son to go to a government school or if a
businessman wanted a government contract, a wasta had to be found. Throughout the
Arab world, wasta was intimately involved in state and nation-building (Makhoul and Har-
rison 2004; Al-Ramahi 2008; Lust-Okar 2009).
In Sudan, wasta developed along three main axes: religious sectarianism, tribal/ethnic
solidarity and ideological afﬁliation. It would be wrong to describe wasta as mere ‘kinship’
or ‘tribalism’. Rather, wasta has mutated within institutions of power in different time
periods. It is loyalty plus access to power. The colonial period centralised wasta in the
state, but as this paper shows, more recent manifestations have followed a more decentra-
lising logic.
The British colonial administration used sectarian and tribal leaders to institutionalise
the state. Most Sudanese Muslims had traditionally belonged to one of the major Suﬁ
sects in the country. The two largest are the neo-Mahdist Ansar led by the al-Mahdi
family and the Khatmiyya led by the al-Mirghani family. They have historically been
characterised by particular geographies, with the Ansar predominating in the west and
the Khatmiyya in the east (Al-Shahi 1981). It was upon this mosaic that state–society
Figure 2. Strength of tie by age.
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relations took shape (Woodward 1991). The Ansar and the Khatmiyya established huge
agricultural estates and trading networks (O’Fahey 1997; Salih 2004) and founded the
two most dominant parties, the Umma and the National Union Party (which later
became the Democratic Union Party, DUP) (Willis and El-Battahani 2010). For those in
South Sudan, or indeed among non-Muslims in the north, party politics was therefore pro-
blematic. Furthermore, even within the north, sectarian parties were never able to claim an
overall majority and were often forced into unstable coalitions. Accordingly, from indepen-
dence in 1956 up until the Islamist coup in 1989, Sudan experienced three periods of
democracy interrupted by two periods of military rule.
Set against this mosaic, the colonial state implanted another source of power. The
British saw a trade-off between education and political consciousness. Education was
limited to those necessary for colonial economic development (Sanyal and Yacoub 1975;
Beshir 1977). Gordon Memorial College (which later became the University of Khartoum)
provided the principle entry point and prestigious regional secondary schools such as
Hantoub, Wadi Sedna, Rumbek and El Fasher acted as feeders, drawing individuals from
around Sudan into Khartoum. Graduates were rare and valuable. If wasta intervened, it
intervened at the point in which students entered education. The children of the elite primar-
ily gained access but if others entered, they could easily get jobs after graduation (Abdel-
salam 1989; Medani 1993). Northern Sudanese and, speciﬁcally, the Dongolawi and Ja’ali
tribes, were the ﬁrst groups brought into educational institutions and state employment.
Known as the jallaba, they organised trade through families maintaining positions within
the state in order to expand their businesses (Mahmoud 1984; Collins 2008).
The system secured the reproduction of elite power by institutionalising privilege into
public institutions (Umbadda 1990). Foreign investment was channelled through the Min-
istry of Finance and the Sudanese Development Corporation, and economic development
was geared towards large-scale, state-directed, agricultural projects such as the Gezira,
Zande and Kenana schemes (Barnett 1977; Bernal 1991; Hassaballa 2008). The state
engaged in large-scale information gathering and economic coordination, conducting
nationwide surveys and extending communication and transportation links through the
extension of railways. The state sat at the centre acting as a ‘gatekeeper’ to foreign invest-
ment and national economic policy-making (Cooper 2002; see also Allen 1995).
While this system was exclusive, it was also institutionalised, backed by a meritocratic
logic. Those who achieved the highest education received the best jobs. It provided the
predictability necessary for modern economic development: by restricting education to
a small few, universities could ensure the value of their qualiﬁcations and allow managers
to trust graduates. It is for this reason that we observe weaker ties among job contacts in
earlier periods. This was patrimonialism at its purest; the public provision of education
allowed for the development of a ‘national’ economy in which trust and information
could circulate easily but this ‘national’ economy was dominated by a group of elites
best able to monopolise state opportunities through their control of the sectarian–tribal
political system.
While this system allowed for the development of a rationalised and some might say
‘modern’ economy within Sudan’s centre, it was ultimately built upon an unstable geopo-
litical settlement outside the centre. The vast majority of Sudanese were excluded from
national development plans (Young 2013). As Alex De Waal (2009) has written, govern-
ance in the peripheries came to develop its own logic, with power from the centre ﬁltering
through a ‘patrimonial marketplace’ in rural areas. Northern elites competed to secure the
loyalties of patrons in more remote areas and in the context of wider regional conﬂict, and
violence increasingly became the medium through which these loyalties were renegotiated
Review of African Political Economy 565
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(Prunier 2005; De Waal 2009). To De Waal, therefore, ‘[p]opular resistance to misgovern-
ment . . . bifurcated into a non-violent civic mobilisation in the central part of the country
and violent insurrection in the peripheries’ (De Waal 2013, 214).
The governance system was also ﬁscally precarious. International terms of trade for
Sudan’s key commodities deteriorated in the 1960s and planners failed to move into
more diversiﬁed forms of agriculture and manufacturing. Owing to the political inﬂuence
exercised by the ‘dominant social forces’ of land-owners, merchants, and tribal and reli-
gious elites (Niblock 1991), subsequent governments struggled to make changes, even
when professing radical ideologies. Similarly, leaders were unable to impose measures
deemed necessary by international ﬁnancial institutions because of internal political
pressures (Brown 1992). Numayri’s ambitious ‘breadbasket’ strategy is a case in point.
While the scheme could have broadened economic opportunities beyond the traditional
elite, it relied on foreign investment and an unsound ﬁscal basis. When foreign invest-
ment dried out, Numayri was forced to engage in a ‘National Reconciliation’ with tra-
ditional elites in order to avert political disaster (Brown 1992). This reconciliation,
however, did little to address the underlying ﬁscal crisis looming beneath the country’s
foundations.
While the Ansar and the Khatmiyya had essentially come to monopolise control over
the state’s economic apparatus, alternative political groups were brewing in Khartoum
and Atbara (an industrial town in the north). Both the Communists and the Muslim Broth-
erhood began in universities and professional associations, and particularly within the Uni-
versity of Khartoum’s Student Union (Woodward 1991; Warburg 2003). These groups were
important to the functioning of the civil service and to the ﬂourishing of civil society in
Khartoum but they were by no means representative of the wider national population.
The next section demonstrates how the Islamists attempted to upset the prevailing
system by propagating their own parallel channels of wasta.
1970s to 1989: ‘going to the market’
The Sudanese Islamist movement emerged from within elite secondary schools and univer-
sities. Unlike the Umma and the DUP, which could command large voting blocks in rural
areas, the Islamists had little appeal outside Khartoum. Their form of Islam was fundamen-
talist and internationalist, unappealing to most Sudanese (De Waal and Abdelsalam 2004;
Zahid and Medley 2006). However, as petrodollars began to ﬁll Sudanese pockets in the
Gulf, Islamist fortunes began to change at home (Jamal 1991; Sidahmed 1997). As
Jamal writes: ‘[r]emittances from the Gulf, in the context of Sudan’s exceedingly bankrupt
economy, . . . [came] to play [a] . . . formidable role in privileging certain social groups and
inﬂuencing political developments’ with ‘[t]he political future of Sudan’s Muslim Brethren
to some extent depend[ing] on social groups with ﬁnancial links with the Gulf states’ (Jamal
1991, 108). Much of this inﬂuence was informal, through personal family networks, but
much of it was channelled by the Islamist movement.
The story of Islamic ﬁnance is illustrative. Ali Abdullah Yacoub was an Arabic teacher
living in Saudi Arabia who became friendly with Prince Mohamed al-Faysal. He convinced
the prince to establish Faysal Islamic Bank in Sudan. Having poor knowledge of economic
matters, Yacoub approached Abdel Rahim Hamdi, a friend from his political days at uni-
versity, to help establish this venture (Abdel Rahim Hamdi later became Minister of
Finance).
The new Islamic bank used a rigorous selection process to identify candidates. It offered
intensive training by Egyptian specialists from Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank. Slowly over time,
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other banks were established: al-Tadamon, al-Shamal, Gharb and al-Baraka. These banks
cooperated to change the system as a whole. Just as Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank had
offered training to Faysal, in turn, Faysal sent its general manager, Ali Omar, to help estab-
lish al-Tadamon. Abdel Rahim Hamdi described this cooperation as part of a wider strategy
to launch Islamic ﬁnance:
We wanted to expand the idea of Islamic banking and if you have three or six entities, it is better
than just playing it alone, in a system that was a little bit hostile. And we wanted to impose upon
the Central Bank the idea that this was a system and not just a single company, Faysal Islamic
Bank, because the Central Bank was very traditional but when they saw four or ﬁve banks, they
thought about us and tried to ﬁnd systems to accommodate us.
One long-standing manager, who had worked in both Faysal and al-Tadamon, backed up
this sentiment by describing Faysal as ‘paving the way for the others’. Another interviewee
singled out the Islamic Development Company as a place where prominent Islamist busi-
nessmen and politicians gained training:
Four or ﬁve ministers and two or three general managers used to work in that company,
although it was a very small company. The ex-Minister of Justice was the legal advisor (Ali
Osman Yassin) . . . it was a building place for training them, to take this ofﬁce, together with
Faysal Bank [and] Tadamon.
He added that, in contrast to private companies that would have commercial reasons for
retaining trained staff, these organisations were ‘not commercial companies – they were
breeders for the whole country.’ Many former employees went into private ventures in
both Sudan and the Gulf, forming an Islamist business network that was sympathetic to
the movement. By 1983, Islamist pressures convinced Numayri to Islamise all banks and
introduce the Civil Procedure Act (Gordon 1985). In practice, many banks continued to
operate with interest. However, under the new regime, the Central Bank took a more
active approach and ‘Islamised’ the entire banking ﬁeld in 1994 (Kahf 2004).
The new Islamic banks favoured small and medium-sized businesses. In 1992, over
90% of their investment was distributed to export/import and only 4% to agriculture,
thereby ‘effectively ensur[ing] support for the Muslim Brethren from the middle and
lower strata of urban entrepreneurs’ (Jamal 1991, 106). In contrast, the old guard of mer-
chants, especially those connected with the Khatmiyya sect, was unable to secure access
to commercial borrowing. They ﬁrst turned to the black market and then in 1982, ‘a
number of wealthy Khatmiyya merchants established the Sudanese Islamic Bank . . . [in]
a clear bid to regain their monopoly of the country’s retail trade and ﬁnancial system’
(Ibid., 107). Nevertheless, those who had not previously been embedded in the traditional
elite were able to tap foreign investment. As one non-afﬁliated manager joked, in reference
to the Islamist movement: ‘They have been telling us, you have to go to the mosque, you
have to go to the mosque but all this time, they have been going to the market.’ The Isla-
mists were building up their own channels of wasta. Crucially these channels drew their
power, not from proximity to the state or to the Ansar and Khatmiyya, but rather from remit-
tance ﬂows, Islamist societies and international Islamic ﬁnance.
One recipient of a Faysal loan was Samia Shabbo. She studied at the University of Cairo,
Khartoum branch (later renamed Neelain University) and was involved in the Islamist move-
ment while at university. Samia began trading at age 12 and, by age 18, had a ‘mini-factory’
using six machines and six workers. She then moved into women’s photography. At this
point, an Islamist social club established by Hassan al-Turabi supported her. In 1987
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Samia received a loan from Faysal Islamic Bank to start her own photography company.
Later she established two salons and a wedding boutique. She is currently running the Busi-
nesswomen’s Association, with Widad Yagoub Ibrahim. In cooperation with the Family
Bank, it has started a development centre to help other women’s businesses. The Business-
women’s Association also has links with the Businessmen’s Association and the Chamber of
Commerce, both of which were privately described as ‘dominated by Islamists’. One foreign
economist seconded to the Ministry of Finance expressed his frustration that these organis-
ations dominated meetings and made it difﬁcult to identify non-afﬁliated businesspeople.
This entrepreneurial approach trickles down into the younger generation. Both the
shabab al-watan (Youth Federation) and the shabab al-benaa (Youth Building Association)
are afﬁliated with the movement. The shabab al-watan provides vocational training and
micro-credit loans to unemployed youth in 117 centres. The government also has a
similar state project, the Graduate Fund, re-established in 2003 by the President and the
Minister of Welfare. Under previous governments, it was charged with ﬁnding state
employment for graduates, but under the Islamists, it has focused on providing support
for self-employment and entrepreneurship. One manager of the Graduate Fund revealed
that he had worked in both shabab al-benna and shabab al-watan and had also been
involved in local politics as an Islamist candidate. He described how his political connec-
tions allowed him to get training and access to important people, so that he did not ‘need to
go to the wazifa rasmia (formal employment)’.
While the Islamistswere gaining powerwithin themarket, theywere still politicallyweak.
The deepening of the ﬁscal crisis would provide them with an opening. In 1985, economic
pressures led to a popular uprising that toppledNumayri. Electionswere held and the Islamists
managed to secure a handful of seats, but the Umma controlled parliament. From 1986 to
1989, Sudan stumbled along under an unstable coalition, with the Islamists ﬁrst lending
support to the Umma, then retracting support when the DUP pressured the Umma to make
peace with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) rebels in the south. Fearing
the repeal of sharia law, the Islamists pulled out. The remnants of Numayri’s poor economic
management and the conﬂict in the south made it difﬁcult for the Umma to hold on.
In 1989, a military coup put an end to this short period of democracy, with the military
soon installing an Islamist government. The new regime was highly suspicious of state
institutions and universities and wary of their role in the downfall of former military
regimes. It therefore pursued a harsh policy of tamkeen (empowerment) to capture the
state for itself. The following sections describe two processes that the Islamists used to
reconﬁgure the state: tamkeen and liberalisation. While these two processes overlap, I
deal with them consecutively as the ﬁrst process diminished in 1999, following a political
split within the movement and the coming of oil.
1989–1999: Tamkeen
Tamkeen refers to the period when the Islamist regime sought to empower itself and con-
solidate its control over the state. Tamkeen can be understood both ideologically, as a
way of imposing ideas about Islam onto society, and politically, as a way of eliminating
opposition. This section focuses on the informalisation of state institutions and the privati-
sation of wasta during tamkeen.
In the early 1990s, universities were purged of political inﬂuence and the curriculum
was ‘Islamised’ and ‘Arabised’ (Breidlid 2005; Bishai 2008). The number of public univer-
sities increased from four to twenty-four in a seven-year period and the system was decen-
tralised into new regions (El-Tom 2007). The reclassiﬁcation of secondary schools,
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polytechnics and religious institutes fuelled this expansion. Financial responsibility was
devolved and universities began to offer two- and three-year diplomas in an effort to
raise funds. National intake rose from 6080 in 1989 to 13,210 the following year and to
132,047 by 2008 (Assal 2010).
These changes reduced educational quality substantially (El-Tom 2007). One university
professor summed it up by describing how she felt she was working in ‘a pretend university
. . . that [was] giving out false qualiﬁcations’. While members of the movement now justify
the expansion as a response to the high social demand for education, it may also be inter-
preted as a way of diluting the power of the University of Khartoum. Both the 1964 United
Front of Professionals and the 1985 Gathering that toppled former dictators had strong con-
nections to the University of Khartoum and its graduate constituents. The Education Revo-
lution thus allowed the regime to simultaneously weaken potential political opposition
while extending an ideological education to large numbers of youth. As the system
expanded, education moved out of its colonial mentality, no longer reﬂecting economic
needs but becoming a joint neoliberal Islamist endeavour. A ‘hyper-inﬂation of qualiﬁca-
tions’ ensued, with expansion largely driven by commercial and proﬁt-making pressures
within universities, and by radical social and political interests within government.
The regime also weakened trade unions, ﬁrst abolishing them and then consolidating
them into a single union. Ever since, the head of the Sudanese Workers’ Trade Union
Federation has been an Islamist politician. Similarly, tamkeen involved a wide-scale reshuf-
ﬂe of all branches of government: military, civil service, parastatal companies, universities
and even some private businesses. In the Sudan Development Corporation, one interviewee
estimated that at least 45% of staff were replaced. When asked how the Islamists knew who
was loyal, he replied:
You know, these people, the regime, the party, or the Muslim Brothers, to be clear, they know
each other, starting from the elementary school, secondary school, the high school, the univer-
sity, they know each other and they don’t trust anybody who is not part of the team. That’s why,
to make sure, that nobody will disturb their rule, they opted to just dismiss those who were not
part of them.
University proved to be the place where people had become ‘known’ and those afﬁliated
with the Communists or the two sectarian parties were replaced. While these policies
allowed the party to gain control of the state and carry out its radical social policies,
tamkeen had a number of undesirable effects.
First of all, tamkeen isolated Sudan. Owing to the regime’s connection to Osama Bin
Laden, Sudan was placed under US sanctions in 1997, which were further increased in
response to the violence in Darfur. Companies with US interests refrained from having
direct business links. In 2005 the United Nations also imposed economic sanctions and
made European companies more hesitant. By now, the ﬁscal situation had also deteriorated
and Sudan was ﬁnally declared uncooperative by the IMF and was unable to receive loans.
Second, the politicisation of the universities and civil service greatly weakened the gov-
ernment’s and private sector’s ability to function. Those with experience were replaced with
people with little or no experience and patterns of recruitment and promotion became
heavily inﬂuenced by personal preference. Institutions such as the Ombudsman and
lajnat ikhtiyar (recruitment ofﬁce) lost what little power they had (Numayri had also wea-
kened them), while the legal system grew so politicised that international jurisdictions
became routine for corporate arbitration proceedings (even when the government was a
party). Constant shufﬂing of civil servants had the effect of compressing the regime’s
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time frame, encouraging short-term corruption over long-term vision. Similarly, it became
more difﬁcult for those in the private sector to trust others. For example, the level of prestige
associated with the older universities disappeared. The degradation of qualiﬁcations had the
effect of stopping managers from advertising positions openly. Instead, they relied on per-
sonal recommendation or used the Internet, which they perceived as being more elitist and
therefore ‘safer’. Managers could not afford to ﬁlter thousands of applications on the basis
of ‘public’ information such as qualiﬁcations and so they increasingly kept information
about vacancies private.
Third, tamkeen aggravated the ﬂight of skilled workers and encouraged students to
travel abroad to seek meaningful qualiﬁcations and training. This had the effect of distribut-
ing members of the traditional elite around the world. The success of DAL Group, Sudan’s
largest and most diversiﬁed company, testiﬁes to the importance of transnational networks
in rebuilding the private economy (Mann 2013). DAL has succeeded precisely because it
has used Sudan’s displaced elite, luring them home and building internal capacities that
do not rely on the state. Wasta grew more globalised, as members of the diaspora
became ‘gatekeepers’ of extraversion in their own right (Cooper 2002).
Lastly, tamkeen (and speciﬁcally, education expansion) had a profound effect on the
Islamist movement. It had emerged from within a very limited number of prestigious
schools and universities. Student bodies were small and students knew one another inti-
mately. As universities began to expand, new Islamists could not be known in the same
way. Inﬂuence through ideological devotion gave way to inﬂuence through powerful
families and strategic political alliances. Today it is common to ﬁnd highly ‘Westernised’
children of leading politicians beneﬁting from the older generation’s piety, while those
on the periphery of the movement have begun to struggle and dissent. One professor
who had been close to important Islamist politicians at school complained they were
now inaccessible. If others asked him for favours from these politicians, he would direct
them to the mosque at prayer time because, he said, ‘that is the only time you see them.’
Another Islamist in a less powerful government body reﬂected this frustration, countering
‘if “alwalaa gabel al-addaa” (loyalty before performance), then why can’t my son get a
job?’ Another professional elaborated:
Within the NCP, there is now three generations. The old guard, the middle one and you could
say, my generation or even younger. What is important, what will give you access to everything
is if you have history with them, if you joined early or if you didn’t join early but your father
did. That will give you access . . . You can’t be NCP anymore. Yes, of course, you can join but
you won’t be accepted within the old guard. Yes, you will be NCP but you won’t have the
beneﬁts.
Many interviewees stressed a change of direction in 1999, when Hassan al-Turabi was
pushed out of the party. He had been behind some of the regime’s more radical policies
but he had also been popular among Darfurians. When he left, Darfurians came under
increasing suspicion and they were purged from government and security (De Waal
2005). In response, the Black Book pamphlet appeared on the streets of Khartoum, docu-
menting the dominance of the awlad al-bahr (children of the Nile, or dominant tribes) in
government (Collins 2008). Many managers used the Black Book as a justiﬁcation for dis-
trusting Darfurian applicants and employees, whom they considered ‘trouble-makers’.
Similarly, among members of the wider population, the threat of Darfur’s violence spilling
closer to home made them more wary of political instability and thus more sympathetic
towards the government.
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In the beginning, tamkeen had been about ideology. The Islamists had isolated Sudan
from the Western world to transform it along Islamist lines. They had spent millions of
pounds of zakat taxes reorienting people in Islamist training camps (De Waal and Abdelsa-
lam 2004). They had expanded education dramatically and Islamised the curriculum.
However, over time, the institutional basis of the state disintegrated and the party jettisoned
its radicals. In 1999 the movement changed its name from the National Islamic Front to the
National Congress Party to reﬂect this change. After the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement with the SPLM in the south and the outbreak of violence in Darfur,
the pragmatists realised that they had to ﬁnd new ways to win northern support.
Speaking to members of his party in 2005, Abdel Rahim Hamdi declared that in the
interests of winning the forthcoming election, ‘[their] mandate [was] to talk about invest-
ment . . . [as] a party manner and not a government nor a state affair’ (Hamdi 2005, 11).
He singled out the ‘geographic North [as the] decisive voting bloc’ and distinguished
between ‘international investment’ ﬂowing from the Oslo Agreement that would go to
areas ‘predetermined in the Peace Agreement’ (South Sudan and the transitional areas)
with ‘Arabic and Islamic investment, both ofﬁcial and private [which] will go to the
Geographic North’ (Ibid., 11). He added: ‘As we in the North have personal and ofﬁcial
connections with the investors in this category, we can inﬂuence it much more than our
chances with Western/European investment’ (Ibid., 11). There is some evidence to
suggest that the government did indeed attempt to extend the party’s presence in rural
areas in the year leading up to the 2010 election. One engineer described how ‘researchers’
were sent into rural areas to talk to residents about their needs and explain that the party (not
the state) was bringing water and electricity. Similarly, interviewees in Khartoum revealed
how senior staff members attempted to use their positions in organisational hierarchies to
mobilise voters. The politics professor Hassan al-Sauori explained how the NCP was the
ﬁrst party to really do this:
The DUP Party was depending on sect and sectarianism is deteriorating and diminished. They
did not get ready for recruiting other people, not from the sect and the same with the Ansar;
they have four or ﬁve wings in the Umma party, four or ﬁve wings in the Union party. But
now, when you are in government, you make patronage to have some connections... patronage,
patronage all over. They go to this village and they give them electricity, they give them water
and this is the only government who did this for us. Patronage, now, is working everywhere.
Not politics, patronage. Because they have something, they will vote for them. Not because
they are Islamists.
To fund this patronage, the party abandoned its ideological commitments to social trans-
formation in favour of a more pragmatic form of political control. It began to work with
Gulf and Asian partners to privatise the state (Hibou 1999) and ‘exogenously modernise’
the economy (Westerﬁeld and Abbink 2004). However, as the next section demonstrates,
patronage and wasta at the ground level became more disorganised and difﬁcult to direct.
1999–2013: liberalisation
This last section deals with the period after 1999, when the Islamists used oil revenue to
redirect rents and to exogenously modernise parts of the economy. They had always
been committed to a neoliberal agenda, but the speciﬁc form of that agenda changed
with time. From the 1970s onwards, their economic power emanated from a vibrant entre-
preneurship among small and medium businesses. Once in power, they used the neoliberal
planks of privatisation and liberalisation to correct macroeconomic problems (thus
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garnering some acceptance among established businesspeople) and to transfer economic
power from traditional state elites into politically afﬁliated hands (International Crisis
Group 2011). Once oil began to ﬂow, this politicisation of the economy became more effec-
tive, as foreign investment from Asia and the Gulf allowed them to develop new, proﬁtable
parts of the economy. Lastly, privatisation removed economic demands on the state caused
both by tamkeen and by external political sanctions. This section concentrates on these last
two aspects in detail.
If we contrast the fate of Sudan Airways with that of the Sudanese oil industry, we see
how much liberalisation has reconﬁgured the state’s role in the economy. Sudan Airways
has been badly affected by sanctions and cannot import necessary parts. In 2007 it was pri-
vatised and sold to mainly Kuwaiti investors. The government retained a 30% share, but
derives little beneﬁt. In contrast, the rents from its sovereignty in relation to foreign airlines
are huge. Each time a foreign plane lands, the government receives landing fees, ﬂying fees,
baggage-handling fees, passenger-handling fees and customs fees, so the more ‘frequency’
an airline has, the more it pays to the government. The government is now taking part in
negotiations over the ‘Open Skies’ policy, which will allow commercial airlines to have
as many ‘frequencies’ as they want.
Privatisation has therefore allowed the party to reorient itself away from the liabilities of
state enterprises towards partnership with foreign investors. Describing similar develop-
ments in the Ethiopian agricultural sector, Jon Abbink has referred to this kind of partner-
ship as an ‘exogenous modernisation’ in which political elites use foreign expertise and
investment to compensate for the weaknesses of the domestic economy (Westerﬁeld and
Abbink 2004; Abbink 2011). In Sudan, this strategy is clearest in the petroleum sector.
Prior to the South’s secession, Sudan had large petroleum reserves but insufﬁcient infra-
structure. Therefore, the government established the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating
Company (GNPOC), a body composed of four companies: Chinese CNPC, Malaysian Pet-
ronas, Indian GNC and Sudan’s state company, Sudapet. These companies competed for
access to blocks and construction tenders. This situation set up a reciprocal relationship
between the NCP and foreign companies and a new kind of economic space, neither
public nor private but ‘outside of Sudan’, as one Sudanese petroleum employee put it.
This employee had graduated from a non-engineering faculty at the University of Khar-
toum and had immediately got a job at CNPC through his relative. He declared that CNPC
‘didn’t follow the [quota] rules’ and estimated that ‘even today (2009) less than 40% of the
ofﬁce [was] Sudanese’. He felt that Sudanese employees were just ‘extras on a set’, present
because the government forced CNPC to hire them. He believed that the majority of his
Sudanese colleagues had got their jobs through relatives in the NCP as part of a reciprocal
relationship in which companies received tenders in return for favours (in my interview
with the Sudanese HR manager at CNPC, I was told that all appointments went through
the lajnat ikhtiyar, the government recruitment ofﬁce). In one case, the niece of a powerful
politician came to work. She was ﬁred two days later because, as the Chinese managers
described, ‘she was lazy.’ Despite the short nature of her commitment, she received a
six-month severance package.
Another graduate studied in the sub-faculty of Petroleum Engineering at the University
of Khartoum. He received training in the Malaysian company Petronas and upon graduation
came to work in the company. He admitted that employment was ‘a little bit political’.
Along with high-performing engineering students, the relatives of politicians would
receive preferential treatment. He explained that these relatives would be sent to the Uni-
versity of Petronas in Malaysia and would return well qualiﬁed. Another graduate gave
an indication of how such selections worked:
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In the year 2002, [an oil installation company] wanted to recruit ﬁve people. They were sup-
posed to have been chosen through the direct result of 20 interviews, which had been chosen
from the result of a 1800-person test. Unfortunately of the ﬁve people employed, three of them
didn’t even go to the exam.
As domestic higher education continues to expand and quality does not improve, foreign
education becomes more important to the Islamists in retaining their control. In effect,
they are attempting to reinstitutionalise wasta but through international institutions.
In 1999 only 32 Sudanese students were enrolled in Malaysian universities (Khalid
2004) but by 2010, that number had jumped to 3000 (Lim and Mun 2010). In 2010 this
foreign training was ofﬁcially extended to civil servants, with the Minister of Human
Resources announcing a partnership that would train 4000 to 5000 senior public ofﬁcials
at the University of Malaya (NPUMA 2010). Some students receive scholarships but
many more ﬁnance their education through independent means or through government
schemes controlled by the regime. Many interviewees complained that such opportunities
were restricted to those with wasta through the party.
The patronage potential of exogenous modernisation exceeds those employed in the oil
sector. A 2007 World Bank Public Expenditure Report indicated that the Sudanese govern-
ment had made substantial increases in civil service employment in both north and South
Sudan from 2001 onwards (World Bank 2007). Although unclear on speciﬁc categories of
expenditure, the data reveals concentrated expenditure in the transferring of federal funds to
local government, Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) demobilisation and South
Sudanese bureaucracy, increases in federal salaries (particularly within security and
defence) and investment in large projects such as the Merowe Dam (see also Martini
2012 for information about increased military spending).
This pattern of expenditure reveals opportunities for patronage. First, patronage through
exogenous modernisation has extended into other ﬁelds, notably engineering and construc-
tion. For example, Merowe Dam was jointly funded by the Sudanese government, China’s
Import Export Bank and several banks from the Arabian Gulf. Its construction and
implementation were likewise carried out by Chinese, French and German engineering
companies. Second, oil wealth could have played a role in the distribution of funds both
to strategic military and security ofﬁcials and to the electoral patronage described above.
In particular, the transfer of federal funds to local levels of government (in line with the gov-
ernment’s decentralisation strategy) would have provided immense opportunities for
patronage, especially under conditions of poor transparency. As Giorgio Musso (2012)
has demonstrated, the NCP had strong popular support in the 2010 election. They did
not need to engage in wide-scale fraud because many northern constituents viewed their
watered-down radicalism up against their ability to provide development projects, and
deemed them vote-worthy. The 2010 election could have moved Sudanese politics closer
to the norm of other Arab countries where, as Ellen Lust-Okar has argued, voters elect
those candidates who are most able to ‘work with government’ and therefore best deliver
public services (Lust-Okar 2009).
The regime has thus used foreign investment, foreign operational expertise and foreign
educational facilities to exogenously modernise strategic parts of the economy, redistribute
power within government and channel patronage to constituents during elections. In con-
trast, less powerful ministries and those living in politically less valuable areas do not
enjoy such beneﬁts. Here, there has been an informalisation of formal procedures and a
shifting of responsibility onto local communities to provide public services and assist
young people in accessing opportunities (Pratten 2000; Abdalla 2012; Zug 2012).
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This fracturing between weak and strong parts of the state is undermining the regime’s
attempts to promote graduate entrepreneurship and reignite the vibrancy that once gave the
Islamists popular grassroots support. For example, a consultant of the Graduate Fund
explained how low-level taxes (often informal and illegally imposed) weaken central gov-
ernment efforts:
one of the biggest obstacles is the enabling environment, that is to say, the legislative, the laws
and the administrative laws in the local community and local municipalities. These constrain
those fresh graduates’ enterprises . . . these taxes hinder them and stop their businesses in
most cases, but the project . . . made an intervention with the governance in the states so as
to exempt this segment from so many taxes, but nevertheless, the local authority come and
say this and this is really a dilemma.
As in Egypt, the NCP have tried to co-opt the discourse around self-reliance and entrepre-
neurship as empowering for graduates (Elyachar 2005). They tell students that: ‘Education
is no longer about employment; it is about knowledge and personal development. Graduates
are responsible for making their own economic livelihoods’ (paraphrased from Author’s
notes). However, old expectations remain; the belief that education brings social mobility
cannot be so easily undone. When graduates try to start entrepreneurial ventures, they
experience excessive and illegal taxes in the ﬁrst three years and political predation from
afﬁliated competitors. The regime is losing control of wasta at the ground level. While
oil wealth has been easy to centralise and control, wealth associated with informal entrepre-
neurship is much harder to control and the regime lacks the discipline and institutional
mechanisms for directing its power through organisations such as the shabab al-watan,
the Graduate Fund and through its afﬁliates in Islamic banks. The Graduate Fund, for
example, has been vastly underperforming and has been unable to meet its targets. Mean-
while, the growth of Sudanese enrolment in foreign, and particularly Asian, universities has
created strong feelings of resentment and exclusion among those who cannot afford to travel
abroad. The structures that have been built to engage youth are therefore inherently
unstable, discharging powerful frustrations as their size grows bigger each year.
The use of exogenous modernisation for patronage has been fuelled by oil, providing
enormous short-term beneﬁts, enlarging budgets to unsustainable levels and reducing press-
ures for long-term ﬁscal and structural reform. Sudan has a weak tax policy and adminis-
tration, with the World Bank describing it as follows: ‘As a whole, the tax system is
fragmented, unevenly applied, and suffers from widespread exemptions and tax holidays
that limit the effectiveness of the existing regime – a weakness made possible by continued
gains from the oil sector’ (World Bank 2007, 13). The same document details poor com-
munication and coordination between different ministries of government (also documented
during my ﬁeldwork). Statistical knowledge on which to base projections and make
decisions is meagre. For example, the last labour survey was conducted in 1994, long
before education expansion had had time to impact the economy. Liberalisation has thus
provided opportunities for short-term gain, but has weakened long-term capabilities to coor-
dinate and control. In other words, while the oil wealth provided opportunities for mass cli-
entelism in the 2010 elections, it is unclear how this system can be sustained in a post-oil
political environment.
Conclusion
The Islamists had to do something radical. Coups and dictatorships had come and gone, but
each time the dust settled, the old sectarian order would re-emerge. The elite was simply too
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engrained in the country’s fabric. If the Islamists wanted to upset this order, they would
have to shake society to its very core. They ﬁrst began to Islamise the ﬁnancial system,
creating incentives for small and medium enterprises. Upon taking power, they launched
tamkeen, replacing large sections of the civil service with loyal party members. They pri-
vatised and liberalised the economy. They initiated an education revolution that expanded
universities nearly tenfold. Thousands of young people entered universities, diluting the
restrictive meritocracy of the former elite and making it difﬁcult for young people to
become known both economically (as job candidates) and politically (as members of
parties). After 24 years in power, the Islamists succeeded in creating a very different
social order, but in the process, they scattered former elites around the world and destroyed
any semblance of institutionalised trust at home.Wasta became more private, decentralised
and transnational. The NCP is an Islamist government, but perhaps more importantly, it is
an economically neoliberal and internationalist government.
Wasta has not diminished despite the dissolution of state institutions under tamkeen.
Rather, relationships of power and loyalty have mutated to reﬂect changing institutional
landscapes. Power has become more personal and arbitrary. In place of institutional privi-
leges, the Islamists have asserted their power through individuals and social networks. They
have been able to escape the creative destruction of tamkeen by using oil wealth and support
from foreign investors to reorient the economy and engage in an incipient mass clientelism.
Now that South Sudan has seceded, weakening the north’s control over oil, the regime will
struggle to maintain control beyond military and security repression.
While Islamist policies have broken the patrimonial basis of the former elite, they have
not replaced it with an apparatus for coordination that has any coherence or stability. Expec-
tations have widened but coordination has weakened. The government must reconsider its
economic policies in light of the weakening importance of its sovereignty in relation to
foreign investment. Without oil, occupying the state is not enough to bring about economic
development and access to patronage. Sudan has long been regarded as a potential breadbas-
ket for the Arabian Gulf and the agricultural sector is labour-intensive and spatially spread.
Agricultural development could halt increasing youth unemployment and ease urbanisation
pressures. Yetmany businesspeople conﬁde that the regime has squandered its opportunity to
use oil wealth for agricultural modernisation. Exogenous modernisation, akin to Ethiopian
agriculture or to the Sudan’s own oil sector, seems unlikely. Foreign investors appear hesi-
tant, considering Sudan too risky and underdeveloped in both infrastructure and human
capacity. As Woertz writes: ‘many of the involved Gulf institutions do not have a single
agro-engineer among their ranks and are at best in a process of commissioning feasibility
studies and scouting land leases’ (Woertz 2011, 124). It is suspected that many agreements
are purely speculative. In the long term, the Islamists would do well to focus on its educated
and unemployed youth, synchronising their education once more with the needs of the
economy. Evidence from other countries suggests that strong industrial policy is required
to jump-start risky sectors and overcome collective action problems (Kelsall 2013). To do
this, the regime must reinstitutionalise coordination and restore a functional civil service.
Sudan’s case has wider relevance. While scholars such as Tobias Hagmann and Didier
Peclard (2010) have framed the negotiation of statehood and state power as a competition
over the ‘institutionalisation of power’, scholars should also strive to understand concurrent
de-institutionalisations of power in struggles over statehood (Lund 2006; Hagmann and
Peclard 2010). Similarly, Frederick Cooper’s (2002) concept of the ‘gatekeeper state’
must be revised in countries where alternative political groups have challenged state insti-
tutions in order to build their own power bases. The Islamists came to power precisely by
channelling non-state remittances into Islamist networks at home, thereby bypassing the
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traditional elite’s monopoly over state extraversion. Now that the Islamists control the state,
unafﬁliated ﬁrms such as DAL Group are similarly using the diaspora to build independent
power outside state control. Wasta under the Islamists has become more private, more
decentralised and more transnational, no longer conﬁned to state gatekeeping. Lastly, the
paper signals that transitions from elite clientelism to mass clientelism involve both political
will (and incentives) and a coordinative structure for directing power and opportunity to
new groups.
There will be no return to the old sectarian politics and elite-clientelism of the past. The
urban population has simply become too large, too diverse, too transnational and too edu-
cated to accept it. At the same time, the Islamists have not managed to build a very success-
ful structure upon which to instrumentalise contemporary wasta for mass engagement.
While the expansion of higher education and the liberalisation of the economy might
have enlarged the possibilities for participation and co-optation, strong institutions and
real economic opportunities are needed to institutionalise that potential into political
capital. Luckily for the Islamists, no other political group seems capable of instrumentalis-
ing contemporary wasta either. What happens next is therefore unpredictable, with a broken
state and a regime that has enlarged expectations beyond its own capabilities to manage.
Over the summer of 2012 and the autumn of 2013, young people protested en masse in
Khartoum and other urban areas. In spite of the harsh response from the security forces,
these protests did not achieve critical mass. It could be that Khartoum residents know
that without the regime, there will be no state left for others to claim and hold. While
there may be some hope in Sudan’s large and growing diaspora and in domestic efforts
to build pockets of competence within the civil service and private sector, predation
from political elites is likely to limit the effectiveness of such efforts. Let us hope, therefore,
that the Islamists ﬁnd their own reasons for wanting to broaden their engagement with the
population and reinstitutionalise their power.
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